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An Anti-Liberal Argument For Religious Freedom*
John H. Garvey
I want to consider why we protect freedom of religion as a constitution-
al right. The commonsense answer, which I think hits close to the truth,
is that we protect it because religion is important. I will try to show that
this answer is better than the alternatives which liberal theory offers.
A. THE AGNOSTIC VIEWPOINT
I begin by considering the standard answers given by liberal legal theory
(and adopted by courts and commentators) to the question, "Why do we
protect freedom of religion?" I deal first with the claim that religious
freedom is an aspect of personal autonomy. Then I address the idea that
freedom of religion prevents political strife. These claims are designed to
protect a variety of choices. The autonomy theory and the political theory
make no assumptions about the truth or value of religious decisions. They
view such questions from an agnostic standpoint.
1.
Some say freedom of religion is important because it is one way (though
only one) of exercising our autonomy as human beings interested in
making our own choices and shaping our own lives. The religious devotee
creates a life for herself around certain kinds of beliefs and values. She
will probably join a community of like-minded people (a church). She
typically has ideas about her relationship to God that orient her in her
daily life. And so on. In doing these things she is protected by what
Laurence Tribe calls "rights of religious autonomy."'
There is nothing unique about religious autonomy. It is a name for one
set of choices people make about how to live, but there are other sets of
choices within the field of autonomy: choices about reproduction, risk
0 This is a chapter from a book entitled WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?, which will be published by
Harvard University Press in January 1997. I have dealt with these same themes, but offered a different
kind of solution, in an article entitled Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 779 (1986).
I. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 14 (2d ed., 1988). See also WALTER
F. MURPHY, ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION ch. 16 (1986); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 140 (1986); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 422 (1987); Note,
Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1984); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056. 1058 (1978).
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taking, vocation, travel, education, appearance, and sexual behavior. For
Tribe religious autonomy is just one aspect of the larger "rights of privacy
and personhood."2
Moreover, within the set of religious choices we attach value to the act
of choosing, not to particular outcomes. A decision to reject God is
entitled to the same protection as a decision to follow him. "[I]ndividual
choice in matters of religion should remain free: individual decisions are
to be protected whether they operate for or against the validity of any or
all religious views .... [T]he individual is freed from ... the oppressive
effects of government regulation in order to believe or disbelieve as he
chooses."'
The Supreme Court has given some support to the idea that autonomy
is the value underlying religious freedom. It held in Torcaso v. Watkins
that Maryland had violated religious freedom by requiring state officehold-
ers to declare their belief in God.4 This suggests that the constitution
attaches equal value to belief and disbelief: the important thing is the
choice, not the outcome.
This conclusion is hard to square with the language of the first
amendment, which protects only the free exercise "of religion." Rejecting
religion is an exercise of freedom, but it is not an exercise of religion.
(Amputation is not a way of exercising my foot.) The free exercise clause
by its terms seems inconsistent with the idea of autonomy. It seems to
favor choices for religion over choices against religion.
One way to avoid this textual limitation is to define "religion" very
broadly--so broadly that even disbelief is a kind of religion. This is what
the Court did in interpreting the draft law. When I was a boy people were
exempt from military service if their "religious training and belief' made
them oppose war. Federal law defined religious belief as "an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation[.]" 5 The Supreme Court interpreted the
law with an eye on the free exercise clause, and said that the question was
whether "the claimed belief occup[ies] the same place in the life of the
objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for exemption[.] ' '6 The idea of "God" is "'more of a hindrance
than a help."' We should think of "God not as a projection 'out there' or
beyond the skies but as the ground of our very being." And "religion" is
2. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1301.
3. Gail Mere], The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under
the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 810-11 (1978).
4. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
5. 50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1958).
6. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
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nothing more than ."the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can
conceive. ""
The autonomy theory views religious freedom from an agnostic
standpoint. This is hardly surprising. It follows rather naturally from the
"autonomous" view of human nature. If you scratch a person deep enough,
the theory holds, you will find a kind of free-floating self. If you looked
at the surface of my life you might say that I was a middle-class Irish
Catholic, husband, father of five children, law professor, part-time
musician, Celtics fan, and so on. I have naturally inherited a variety of
moral convictions (those typical of bourgeois Catholics, or lawyers, etc.).
I am also moved by various desires that arise from and act upon the
details of my life (I want prestigious publishers for my books, money for
my children's education, time with my wife, etc.).
But my essential self is able to rise above these details. It is unencum-
bered, unsituated. It can step back from my habitual convictions and
desires (my first-order preferences), reflect critically on them, and change
them to suit its own plan (second-order preferences) for what my life
should be like.8 Exactly where I get my second-order preferences is a
matter of some dispute. Some say that I am guided by reason to universal-
ly applicable principles.9 Others say that I just make them up.10 But
everyone agrees that it's up to me--to my unencumbered self-to choose
them, however I might find them.
This view of human nature is the basis for a powerful argument in favor
of freedom. A just political order has to take account of the way people
really are. It must, in other words, respect their freedom to act as
unencumbered selves on their second-order preferences. In the case of
religion this means that it must view them as persons choosing, from a
detached position, a theological orientation. This is what I mean by saying
that the autonomy theory assumes the agnostic viewpoint. I might be a
Catholic in my daily life, but that is a first-order preference. The real me
is able to step back from it, assume an agnostic stance, and make a fresh
start. I might then renew my religious commitment, but I might reject it.
7. Id. at 180-83. The Court's quotations are drawn from JOHN A.T. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD
15-16 (1963). II PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957); DAVID S. MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A
RELIGION 95 (1951). Cf Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
In retrospect it is possible to see the Court making the same kind of move in Torcaso v. Watkins.
The Court seemed to say at one point that Torcaso might have a religious objection to declaring his
belief in God: "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered
a belief in the existence of God are . . Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." 367 U.S. 488,
495 n.Il (1961).
8. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).
9. This is how Kant formulates the categorical imperative. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON 30 (Lewis White Beck, trans., 1956) ("So act that the maxim of your will could
always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law."). Rawls appeals to a similar
idea. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 516 (1971) ("[A]cting autonomously is acting from principles
that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings.").
10. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (Hazel E. Barnes, trans., 1953).
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It does not really matter. The important thing is that the real me should
organize my life along lines it freely chooses. The law protects religious
freedom to facilitate that choice.
I have argued elsewhere that the autonomy theory is in one sense too
powerful. It holds that a just society must let its citizens choose how to
live their own lives. Some relevant choices are religious, so it follows that
the government must not interfere with them. But there is nothing special
about religious choices in this argument. They are on a par with promiscu-
ous sex, cigarette smoking, and the practice of optometry. Our instincts
and the language of our constitution tell us, though, that there is a
difference. The bill of rights protects the free exercise of religion. It says
nothing about free love, free trade, or excise taxes on tobacco. What we
need is an argument that protects religion while leaving unprotected many
other activities that we do not support as strongly.
Having said this much, I will not pursue the point further. I want to turn
instead to a second problem with the autonomy theory. It concerns the
assumptions about human nature that I outlined above. One is the factual
assumption that we can step back from our convictions and desires and
reorganize them according to second-order preferences that we freely
choose. Another is the more value-laden assumption that we should do this
in order to live "authentic" lives. There are those who would dispute both
assumptions, and people who want religious freedom are among those
most likely to do so.
Consider first the factual assumption. It is inconsistent in several ways
with recurring ideas in Christian theology. The notion of original sin is
meant to suggest the inherent imperfection of human nature. In the
strongest statements of this idea--Augustine is a good example--it entails
our inability to master sinful desires and to freely will doing good. In the
common phrase, human nature is the slave of sin." The counterpoint to
this unhappy view of human nature is the idea of grace. It is a kind of
sharing in divine life, a power that enables us to control sinful desire, live
good lives, and win salvation. But grace is given to us by God gratuitous-
ly.'2 We cannot call it down with a rain dance, and we cannot behave as
we should without it. It is out of our control. This aspect of grace,
followed to its logical conclusion, leads to the Calvinist notion of
predestination: our salvation is entirely in God's hands, and some are not
saved.
This view of human nature affects the way many religious people look
at the idea of choice. The individual does not have complete control over
choosing the religious option. It is God who makes the choice. I might
I I. AUGUSTINE, FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY (ENCHIRIDION) ch. 9. § 30 (Louis A. Arand, trans.,
1947); MARTIN LUTHER, THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL 242-43 (Packer and Johnston trans., 1957); I
JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 318 (John Allen trans., 1936).
12. See JAROSLAV J. PELIKAN. THE MELODY OF THEOLOGY 107 (1988).
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have to accept God's choice and cooperate in carrying it out, but I am cast
as a supporting actor. Thus the Jews understand themselves as the chosen
people. Their stories tell of people pursued by God and brought back to
do his work. Jonah, called by God to be his prophet, tried to escape on a
boat for Tarshish but was brought back by miraculous means.' In the
New Testament Jesus himself set the example by praying before his death,
"Father, if it be thy will, take this cup from me. Yet not my will but thine
be done."'14 God converted the apostle Paul by striking him to the ground
and blinding him.' 5 Alan Simpson has argued that a similar experience
of conversion is the essence of Puritanism. 6
Those who take this view of human nature will also disagree with the
autonomy theory about the value of running our own lives according to
our second-order preferences. That is not the basis of real freedom.
Augustine claims, for example, that real freedom is freedom from the
bondage of sin. "And it is out of the question for free will to realize this
freedom through its own power; this it can do only through the grace of
God[.] " 7 It sounds paradoxical, but it is accurate to say that Christian
freedom consists not in making our own choices but in obeying the law
of God.
The autonomy theory, then, bases religious freedom on a view of human
nature that many religious people would reject. This need not be a fatal
defect. We also justify freedom of speech on grounds that some speakers
would reject-we say that it promotes democracy, and yet we grant it to
Nazis who do not believe in democracy. But religious believers play a
crucial role in free exercise law. They are not like the Nazis. They are like
the New England town meeting--the paradigm around which the theory
is built. If the theory does not work for them, there probably is something
wrong with it.
I want to close this discussion with a doctrinal point. Free exercise law
tends to assume a kind of split-level character. Besides its other shortcom-
ings, the autonomy theory fails to explain this tendency.
In some areas of the law believers and unbelievers get equal protection.
This is how it is with compelled worship and belief. Agnostics as well as
Quakers can object to a test oath.'" But there are other areas where the
13. Jonah 1-2.
14. Luke 22:42.
15. Acts 9:1-19.
16. ALAN SIMPSON, PURITANISM IN OLD AND NEW ENGLAND 2 (1955).
17. AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at ch. 28 § 106.
18. The establishment clause would also allow an agnostic to object to a test oath, Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. at 489-495, but not because it violates her religious freedom. One can object to a
religious establishment without having to make such a showing. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). An established religion is
objectionable for a number of reasons besides its harmful effect on religious freedom. It can be bad
politics, bad educational policy, bad science, and so on. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116 (1982); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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law protects only believers. The free exercise clause sometimes requires
states to pay money to religious believers. It does not require payment to
agnostics. 9 It excuses Amish children from public school, but not
agnostics.20 It protects the internal affairs of churches but not other
associations against government interference.
In recent years the Court has shown an inclination to even out these
differences. It has held that the constitution does not, as a general rule,
require special treatment for religiously required behavior.22 But this
principle is still subject to several qualifications. The first and most
obvious of these is that the free exercise clause still forbids discrimination
against religion. That in itself is a kind of special treatment. There is no
comparable rule protecting nonreligious action. The army cannot have a
special rule against yarmulkes. But it can have a rule preferring yarmulkes
to other nonuniform garb.23 Second, the Court has left standing all the
old cases requiring religious exemptions (the ones about government
benefits, school attendance, church affairs, etc.). It has even enlarged uponsome of them.24 These different levels of protection suggest that there are
several principles at work in the law of religious freedom, not just one.
The autonomy theory is appealing in its simplicity. But it is too simple to
explain the actual complexity of the law.
2.
The second standard argument for freedom of religion is political rather
than ethical. The argument is that the denial of freedom causes strife that
leaves everyone worse off. We can find both comparative and historical
evidence for this conclusion. Lebanon, Iran, India, and the Sudan have
recently seen violent struggles for religious supremacy. England and much
of Western Europe did so in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The
Supreme Court has found parallels in early American history. "In assuring
the free exercise of religion, the Framers of the First Amendment were
sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions
19. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) ("There is no doubt that
[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause' .... Purely secular views
do not suffice."); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
20. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972).
21. See John H. Garvey. Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 567 (1990).
22. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. 45 U.S.C. § 774. The law overturns the result of the decision in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986).
24. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. I.
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of civil disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all of the
Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience.""5
Like the autonomy theory, the political theory tries to justify religious
freedom from an agnostic viewpoint. It stresses two kinds of harm
affecting unbelievers. One is civil war. Even noncombatants get killed in
a civil war, and everyone suffers from the collapse of the government and
the economy. The other harm is persecution. Unbelievers cannot be
prevented from practicing their faith. (They have none.) But if the
government wants to compel a particular form of religious observance it
might have to "torture, maim and kill . 'atheists' or 'agnostics' along
with nonconforming believers.2 6
This theory, like the autonomy theory, makes freedom universally
available. But here the value of freedom is instrumental, not intrinsic. It
leads to peace. If it did not, we would take another approach. The
autonomy argument, by contrast, said that freedom was intrinsically good
for people like us. Of course it had to make some controversial assump-
tions about what kind of people we were. It is a virtue of the political
argument that it dispenses with those assumptions. And there is much else
to recommend it. It is realistic and practical, and goes some way toward
justifying a special place for religious freedom. It does, though, have some
weaknesses. The most important one is that it is incomplete.
Consider first the case of fringe groups. In American society there are,
depending on how you count, hundreds or thousands of them. They
include small but well known sects (Hare Krishnas, Moonies) and smaller,
little known local cults. For our purposes they also include unchurched
believers--religious individualists who seek God in their own way. The
political defense of freedom gives no protection to these people. If a group
is sufficiently small the government can simply stamp it out without
running the risk of civil war. Of course civil war is only one kind of strife.
Stamping out fringe groups is persecution, and the political argument is
designed to avoid that too. But what is wrong with fining, jailing,
medicating, (executing?) religious eccentrics? These forms of punishment
25. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,464 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-1I (1947); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 214; Engel
v. Vitale. 370 U.S. at 426-33: Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38, 54 (1985); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306. 318-19 (1952) (Black. J., dissenting).
Most of the cases that stress this aspect of religious freedom deal with government aid to religion
that the Court has held unconstitutional under the establishment clause. The theory is nonetheless
revelant to our understanding of the free exercise clause for several reasons. First ofall it is mentioned,
though not as often, in free exercise cases too. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 175-76
(1944) (Murphy. J., dissenting). Second, one reason for forbidding an establishment of religion is that
we can head off nascent free exercise violations by keeping government religiously neutral. That is the
most persuasive argument for incorporating the establishment clause into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment--it is "a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty."
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring). Persecution is most likely
to occur when one sect gains control of the government and tries to stamp out its rivals.
26. Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting).
1996]
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues
and cure are not in themselves objectionable, the way cruel and unusual
punishment would be. We routinely apply them to drug offenders and
think that we're doing the right thing. The obvious answer is that there is
a difference between religious activity and drug dealing: one is good and
the other is bad. That is the very argument I will make in the next section.
But it takes us beyond our concern with political strife.
So the political strife argument does not protect groups who cannot fight
because they are too small. Neither does it protect groups (some of them
large) who are unwilling to fight. The Amish on principle flee from
controversy and eschew politics. Quakers are well known for their
pacifism. Groups that are far larger engage in many practices that they see
as desirable but not essential, and that they would not defend with
violence. Consider the employment practices of Catholic schools. The
political defense of freedom gives no shelter to these groups if they pose
no threat to peace.
I think we can state these objections in even more general form. The
political explanation tells us that freedom is good because it brings peace.
It does not tell us why we should prefer freedom to other means of
bringing peace. It gives us no reason to object to the suppression or the
establishment of religion, provided the job is done ruthlessly enough to
prevent civil war. Religion was an insignificant cause of strife in the
Soviet Union from Stalin's time until very recently.27 There was little
freedom, but that is no objection if all that matters is peace. The obvious
advantage of freedom is that it respects piety as well as peace. But we
need an argument that will tell us why it is good to respect piety. 8
27. Ironically strife began (e.g., between Christians and Muslims in Armenia) only after the
government allowed a degree of freedom in 1989.
28. One occasionally hears a third explanation which assumes (unlike the first two) that there is
something special about religion. The practice of religion helps in a unique way to build good character.
But the reason for protecting religious freedom is that people educated in this way make good citizens,
and the republic is better off for their membership. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE. THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 26-27 (1965); Michael W. McConnell. Accommodation of Religion. 1985 SUP. CT. REV.
I, 14-24.
The Supreme Court usually mentions this "republican" value by way of thanks to losing claimants.
When it denies financial aid to parochial schools the Court acknowledges their valuable service. When
it forbids prayer in public schools the Court notes that "many of our legal, political and personal values
derive historically from religious teachings." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Cf Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 314. Once in a while the republican value
is decisive. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 225-226, 235.
This argument has a different political slant than the first two. If religion provides a public benefit
the government might want to encourage it, not just allow it. There is a danger lurking here for the
agnostic. But don't let this obscure the more obvious point. The republican argument, like the first two,
is designed to appeal to the agnostic. It offers a reason why someone who sees no truth in religious
claims should nonetheless want to protect religious liberty.
I think there is something in this point, but far too little to explain our commitment to free exercise.
Some would say that it rests on a debatable empirical assumption. I am more concerned about two other
points. One is that the argument is paradoxical when it is used to justify religious exemptions (from the
draft, from school attendance laws, etc.). It says that if we want to promote good citizenship, we should
let religious people disobey laws that others have to obey. But that just doesn't follow. The other point
is that the argument lets the tail wag the dog. It says that: (i) religion is special, it changes people's
[Vol. 7:275
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B. THE BELIEVER'S VIEWPOINT
The best reasons for protecting religious freedom rest on the assumption
that religion is a good thing. Our constitution guarantees religious freedom
because religious people want to practice their faith. Mark DeWolfe Howe
said: "Though it would be possible ... that men who were deeply
skeptical in religious matters should demand a constitutional prohibition
against abridgments of religious liberty, surely it is more probable that the
demand should come from those who themselves were believers."29 I will
examine the matter from their point of view.
In an earlier chapter of the book from which this paper is drawn I
attempt to show that love is a complex phenomenon, and that the
argument for freedom to love is correspondingly complex. It is the same
way with religion. There are different forms of religious action, and
various reasons that believers would give for protecting them. The ones I
will mention are not intended to be a scientific taxonomy. They are just
clusters of recurring problems that seem to warrant similar treatment.
One such form of distinctively religious action is the performance of
ritual acts. These include prayer and other kinds of worship; compliance
with sumptuary rules governing dress, diet, the use of property; the
observance of sacred times (feasts and holy days) and places (pilgrimages
to shrines); rites connected with important events in the believer's life
(birth, death, maturity, marriage); and so on.
Acts like these make sense only in the context of an entire religious
tradition. Acts of worship presuppose a belief in a supreme being (God).
In Christianity, Judaism, and Islam God is described as the creator, lord,
and judge of the world we live in. The believer thinks that acts of worship
are good because they please God or harmonize with the order of nature.
Other forms of prayer presuppose a belief in a transcendent reality-a kind
lives, and (ii) one effect of this is that they are better citizens. But why isn't (i) a better reason than (ii)
for protecting religious freedom? (Compare: (i) Drug M cures cancer, and (ii) one effect of this is that
people who would formerly have died now survive to pay taxes.)
29. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 15 (1965).
The free exercise clause is different in this way from the establishment clause. Many judges,
lawyers, and historians assert that the establishment clause has its roots in the Enlightenment. Its
purpose, they say, is political (to protect the state against religion) rather than theological (to protect
churches against the state).
I must digress to say that I disagree with this version of history. It might explain the sentiments of
Thomas lefferson, but it ignores important evangelical influences behind the adoption of the
establishment clause. At the very least the clause was meant to serve both theological and political
purposes. See id.; ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); THOMAS J. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS (1986); GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA(1987); Michael W. McConnell, 7Te Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
Be that as it may, a guarantee of free exercise is not ambiguous like a prohibition of establishment.
Its clients are religious actors, and its purpose is to protect them against government interference.
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of life outside our world that is more real than our own, and that affects
us in miraculous and mundane ways. We may go on living there (in
heaven or hell) when we die. Prayer is the means by which we communi-
cate with and try to influence this reality. Still other rites presuppose the
existence of a social organization that enables like-minded people to act
together. Some are led by a specialized class of functionaries who teach,
supervise, and minister to ordinary members.
There is in our traditions a religious argument for religious freedom that
is peculiarly associated with ritual acts. It is, simply, that it is futile to
coerce people to perform ceremonies (prayer, worship, declarations of
belief) they do not believe in. This idea has ancient roots,3" but it was
most fully developed by English Protestants during the seventeenth
century. Locke appeals to it in his Letter Concerning Toleration: "[T]rue
and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without
which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by
outward force."'" Coercion can be worse than futile--it can be counter-
productive. In Milton's phrase, to force a ritual performance is "to compell
hypocrisie, not to advance religion.3
In modem free speech law we often run across the idea that the mind
is a private domain that the government should not, and as a practical
matter cannot, enter.3 Locke's and Milton's claims are different. They
rest on a religious idea about our relations with God. Coerced ritual is
futile because it cannot put the soul in touch with God. The individual
cannot hear God unless he has faith. And faith does not come to people
just because they go through the ritual motions. God gives it to whom he
wills. It is an idea characteristic of Protestantism that this happens in a
very individual way. The most effective medium is scripture, through
which God may speak to the pious reader.
This distinctively Protestant "right of private judgment" began as a
protest against the Catholic Church's claim to mediate between God and
individual souls. But it served equally well as an objection against state
mediation.34 Roger Williams underlines the connection in The Bloudy
Tenent:35
30. See. e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2-2, Q.10, art. 8.
31. JOHN LOCKE. THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 127 (J.W. Gough ed., 1946).
32. John Milton, A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes, in JOHN MILTON: SELECTED
PROSE 289, 311 (C.A. Patrides. ed., 1985).
33. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
Cf. BENEDICT SPINOZA. THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE, ch. 20 (1958).
34. URSULA R.Q. HENRIQUES, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND 1787-1833 21 (1961).
35. WILLIAM HALLER. LIBERTY AND REFORMATION IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 157 (1955).
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In vaine have English Parliaments permitted English Bibles in the
poorest English houses, and the simplest man or woman to search the
Scriptures, if yet against their soules perswasion from the Scripture, they
should be forced (as if they lived in Spaine or Rome it selfe without the
sight of a Bible) to beleeve as the Church beleeves.
Let me turn now to a second form of religious action, and a different
argument for religious freedom. Members of a religious tradition typically
want to acquire and spread knowledge about the esoterica of their belief,
ritual forms, ceremonial duties, and so on. These special kinds of religious
truth are often set down in sacred texts (Bible, Torah, Koran) and
elaborated upon in written and oral commentaries (Talmud, Sunna).
Believers like to study these texts and commentaries, to discuss them with
others, and in some traditions to bring them to the attention of unbelievers.
Those who feel this way sometimes argue that the freedom to acquire
and spread religious knowledge leads us to the truth. We inherit this idea,
like the last, from seventeenth century English Protestantism. It is the
message of Milton's Areopagitica-an expression of Puritan faith
published in the same year as Roger Williams's Bloudy Tenant. Milton
offered several reasons why unlicensed printing would promote the
discovery of religious truth. One was the now familiar claim that truth will
prevail over a falsehood in any free encounter.36 A less familiar but more
radical idea was that God's revelation is progressive. This makes free
inquiry not only safe but actually desirable. Individual thinkers might
wander astray, but the net social effect of freedom is to bring us closer to
God. "To be still searching what we know not by what we know, still
closing up truth to truth as we find it . . . this is the golden rule in
Theology as well as in Arithmetic, and makes up the best harmony in a
Church."3 7
Let me reemphasize that these two arguments (futility, truth) rest on
religious premises (faith is a gift; revelation is progressive). They will
convince only religious believers. But within that group they have carried
the day. Consider the current positions of the Catholic Church and the
Presbyterian Church--the two chief targets of Puritan polemicists like
Milton and Williams.
The Catholic Church's Declaration on Religious Freedom was
promulgated during the Second Vatican Council in 1965. The Declaration
offers several reasons for protecting religious freedom. Prominent among
them is the idea that faith arises through internal communication between
God and the individual:" "For of its very nature, the exercise of religion
36. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 612-14 (Gordon Campbell ed., 1990).
37. Id. at 608.
38. THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 681 (1966). See id. at 689-90.
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consists before all else in those internal, voluntary, and free acts whereby
man sets the course of his life directly toward God. No merely human
power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind." Equally
prominent is the notion that freedom assists the search for religious
truth:39
Truth ... is to be sought after in a manner proper to the dignity of
the human person and his social nature. The inquiry is to be free, carried
on with the aid of teaching or instruction, communication, and dialogue.
In the course of these, men explain to one another the truth they have
discovered, or think they have discovered, in order thus to assist one
another in the quest for truth.
The 200th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
adopted a Policy Statement on religious liberty in 1988. It, too, offers a
variety of reasons for securing freedom. One is that faith cannot be
coerced:40 "Religious insight and faith come from God, who exists over
and beyond the powers and principalities of earth. Such insight and faith
are recognized and received; they can neither be commanded nor
controlled by civil authority, military power or religious piety." The other
is that control of religion inevitably leads to suppression of the truth,
because "(t]here are no foolproof human mechanisms by which to test the
authenticity of insight claimed to be from God."'
Let me turn now to a third variety of religious action, and a different
argument for religious freedom. Religious believers are often bound by
special moral obligations. These come from a moral code that has some
supernatural sanction (the law in Judaism, the shari'a in Islam). Such a
code often demands forms of behavior that the rest of society views as
supererogatory, morally neutral, or even (occasionally) wrong. A violation
of the moral code may be seen as something worse than a breach of
duty-as a kind of personal harm or insult to the author of the code,
which calls for repentance and might be punished or forgiven on a
transcendent level.
About these kinds of actions we might say that the government should
not force people to violate moral duties if (in their system of belief) they
will face transcendent consequences. Otherwise, X might have to choose
between violating the law and risking damnation. This is how it was with
the early Mormons who were convicted for the practice of polygamy.42
Or X might be forced to forego a great good. An American Indian recently
39. Id. at 680-81.
40. GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE 54 (1989).
41. Id.
42. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1879). Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209;
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 644 (1943) (Black & Douglas, AJ., concur-
ring).
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complained that the government's use of a social security number for his
daughter would "rob [her] spirit.'
43
Of course the government often causes great harm to unbelievers as
well. A religious pacifist fears for his salvation when he is drafted, but the
average Marine also suffers at the thought of leaving his family and going
into combat. From a religious point of view, though, the cases are not
comparable. The harm threatening the believer is more serious (loss of
heavenly comforts, not domestic ones) and more lasting (eternal, not
temporary).44 That is what justifies restricting this special kind of
freedom to religious claimants alone.
This is a consequentialist argument for freedom (though the consequenc-
es it relies on are religious). But we could also make a nonconsequentialist
argument. Moral codes impose religious duties, and there is something
uniquely wrong with forcing a person to violate a religious duty even if
she is not primarily concerned about final rewards and punishments. 4 A
strict Calvinist, for example, sees no connection between the performance
of religious duties and election to heaven.4' But she can still demand
religious freedom. The focus of her claim is not her own destiny. She is
concerned instead with the effect on God, as it were--she has to
disappoint him to comply with the law. The individual places great value
in keeping faith with such duties, and it is this value that religious liberty
protects.
7
These arguments about suffering and duty differ from the earlier
arguments about futility and truth. Claims about suffering and duty focus
on the personal interests of religious believers. They are an appeal to
rights in the modem sense-a form of protection for people who are losers
in the political process. Claims about the futility of coercion and the
discovery of truth focus on a larger social interest. "We will all be better
off," the believer says, "if we allow religious freedom." (Compare the
43. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 604 (M.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, Bowen v. Roy. 476 U.S. 693
(1986).
44. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining 'Religion' in the First Amendment, 1982 U. OF ILL. L.F. 579,
597-601.
45. Chief Justice Hughes gave an eloquent statement of this position in his dissent in United States
v. Macintosh:
[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been
maintained.... One cannot speak of religious liberty... without assuming the existence of a
belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God. . . . [F]reedom of conscience itself implies
respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty.
283 U.S. 605, 633-634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.. dissenting). See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 445 (1971).
46. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 803-04
(1984).
47. I realize that there are still cases (where we want to give protection) that fall outside the
principles I have discussed. Consider, for example, forms of observance (like dress or dietary codes
perhaps) that are religiously desirable, but neither required nor transcendently enforced.
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argument that free speech is a form of self-expression, and the argument
that free speech is crucial for self-government.)
Along with this difference in focus is a difference in coverage. The
earlier arguments apply universally. Coercion is futile no less for atheists
than for Catholics and Jews. God may give them faith or he may not, but
the government cannot help him out. So too with the discovery of truth.
It's no use letting only right-thinking Christians search, because we're
talking about revelation and God can reveal himself to anyone. As the
gospel says, "The spirit blows where it wills."'48 The arguments about
suffering and duty, by contrast, offer protection only to religious believers.
The believer's suffering is special precisely because she believes in
heaven, hell, eternal life, and so on. The believer's duties are more
compelling just because they arise from God's commands.
This explains what I called the split-level character of free exercise law.
In some areas the clause protects everyone. This happens when we are
dealing with ritual acts and the pursuit of knowledge. Atheists and
Quakers alike can object to laws prescribing forms of faith (test oaths) and
worship (school prayers). Anyone can object to a law that forbids inquiry
(the teaching of evolution) for religious reasons. Similarly, anybody can
object--on free exercise or free speech grounds-when the government
tries to limit communication about religiously significant questions. These
matters are all covered by the first set of principles: compelled belief is
futile; revelation is progressive.
In other areas the free exercise clause protects only religious believers.
The cases where this happens are cases about compliance with a moral
code. X's faith might require him to leave his job, or school, or the army.
The Court used to give serious consideration to all such claims. Today it
is harder to get special treatment, but it is still possible. And it remains
true now, as before, that "to have the protection of the Religion Clauses,
the claims must be rooted in religious belief.' 49 This disparity is ex-
plained by the second set of principles: believers face a special kind of
suffering; they are subject to a higher kind of duty.
The draft cases do not fit in this picture. None of the reasons I have
given seems to cover the conscientious objection of nonreligious young
men to service in the armed forces. But we should not generalize from
these cases, any more than we should make death penalty cases the pattern
for rules of criminal procedure. Killing is an extreme act, and the feeling
of dread that attends it can give even nonreligious duties an absolute cast.
[Vol. 7:275
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49. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 215-216. Cf McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
at 10-13.
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C. REPRISE
I have argued that we should take the believer's viewpoint rather than
the agnostic's viewpoint in thinking about religious freedom. But my
argument seems incomplete. It relies upon reasons that only some people
find convincing. And sometimes it protects freedom only for those who
are convinced. How can such a lopsided idea justify one of our basic
constitutional rights?
I will address that question after a couple of introductory comments. I
admit that my argument for religious freedom is lopsided, but I want to
stress that this is not as serious a problem as it might appear. This is so,
first of all, because it does not require agnostics to give up something for
nothing. Free exercise law has a split-level character. On one level it gives
special protection to religious believers. But on another level it treats
everyone alike. The government cannot force anyone to perform ritual
acts, and it cannot interfere with the pursuit of religious knowledge. This
means that everyone has a reason to support some degree of religious
freedom. The only really hard question is why an agnostic would support
special treatment for religious people who want to comply with a moral
or ceremonial code.
My other preliminary point is a partial answer to that question. In
Section A I observed that religious freedom appeals to agnostics as a way
of avoiding political strife. Civil war and persecution hurt everyone. If we
can avoid them by allowing more freedom to religious actors, then we
should do so. The weakness I saw with the political argument was that it
gave us no reason to prefer freedom to other ways of keeping the peace.
But it is at least as good as the alternative. Peace is a good (if not a
sufficient) reason for agnostics to support a full measure of religious
freedom.
Let me now turn to my main point. I began this paper with two
arguments for religious freedom (autonomy, political strife) that were
designed to appeal to everyone. This is the standard method of justifying
social practices in liberal theory. It is, to take a more famous example, the
technique used in social contract theory. We need not test a practice
against some objective standard of goodness if we can show that everyone
would agree to it. The agnostic point of view is a device (like the veil of
ignorance °) for securing everyone's agreement. It keeps the contracting
parties ignorant about certain details of their situation so that they are
willing to make concessions. The most important thing to hide from the
parties is information about their goals in life. If I know that I will be
50. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 24 (1971).
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committed to the ideals of Mao Zedong I will insist on rules (like the
dictatorship of the proletariat) that suit me, but that other people will not
like. If I am ignorant about my own ends the safe bargain is one that is
fair to everybody, because when the veil is lifted I could be anybody. As
you might expect, the best way to be fair to everybody is to maximize
freedom. That lets each person pursue her own goals.
The standard arguments assume the agnostic point of view, then,
because they want a rule of religious freedom that is fair to everyone.
Fairness here has two dimensions. One is consent. Universal consent is a
good indication that a rule treats everyone fairly. (This is why social
contracts are always adopted unanimously.51) The agnostic point of view
tries to base freedom on principles everyone can agree with. Revelation is
out because it is hidden from some people. We are asked to look instead
at facts about human nature and our social situation: the autonomy
argument refers to the unencumbered self; the political strife argument
refers to the causes of war and peace.
The other dimension of fairness is reciprocity. A contract is fair in this
sense if the parties share equally in the benefits of the bargain. The
autonomy argument satisfies this condition by making religion just one of
many protected choices, and by offering equal religious freedom to
believers and unbelievers. The political argument says that freedom results
in a public good (peace) that everyone enjoys.
The religious defense of free exercise is lopsided because it violates
these conditions of fairness. The principles that it relies on to justify
freedom--futility, truth, suffering, and duty-all refer in some way to
religious beliefs that many people do not hold. This makes it hard for
some people to consent. The religious defense also gives special protection
to some kinds of religious action. That is, it excuses religious actors from
some generally applicable laws when their moral code requires another
course of conduct. This violates the condition of reciprocity. Why should
we prefer an argument of this kind over arguments that seem to satisfy the
canons of fairness?
For several reasons. First, the standard arguments themselves fail the test
of fairness. The autonomy theory, like my own, appeals to assumptions
about human nature (the unencumbered self, the value of authenticity) that
are inconsistent with convictions that many religious people hold about
original sin, grace, faith, and revelation. In the real world these people
would not consent to a social contract based on autonomy. To avoid this
problem the theory asks us to assume the agnostic viewpoint (the veil of
ignorance). But why not ask agnostics to assume the religious viewpoint?
That too would produce unanimous consent. It would not be consistent
5 I. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 17 (165 1); LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT,
ch. 8; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE § 47 (John Ladd, trans., 1965);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 122. 139 (1971).
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with liberal theory, because it commits us to a view of the good before we
have resolved the issue of rights. But we cannot assume the correctness of
liberal theory. That is the very question we're debating. If my theory will
not get universal consent, neither will the autonomy theory.
The political strife theory is flawed in the same way. It asks us to make
the empirical assumption that we can only have civil peace through
religious freedom. But there are other ways of avoiding strife; repression
is one of them. Unless freedom has some other good points, there is no
reason to prefer it to repression.
There is reason to doubt, then, that the standard arguments are more fair
than mine. My own approach, on the other hand, has some real strengths
that they lack. It is the most convincing explanation for why our society
adopted the right to religious freedom in the first place. It is possible to
imagine a society of skeptics insisting on a free exercise clause, but the
idea is far-fetched.
The religious justification is also the reason many--perhaps
most--religious believers claim the right to freedom today. It enables them
to perform their religious duties, and to avoid religious sanctions. It allows
them to pursue the truth, as God gives them to know the truth. And no
other course could bring them closer to God.
Finally, the religious justification is the only convincing explanation for
the split-level character of free exercise law. Sometimes religious believers
and nonbelievers are treated alike, but sometimes the law protects only
religious believers. This is not something that we can explain by appeals
to consent and fairness. It violates the canon of reciprocity. The only
convincing explanation for such a rule is that the law thinks religion is a
good thing.
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